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Abstract. It is widely assumed among contemporary philosophers that Descartes’ 
version of ontological proof, among other weaknesses, makes an impossible and 
unjustified move from the mental world of concepts to the real (actual) world of 
things. Contrary to this opinion I will try to show that Descartes’ famous principle 
of clear and distinct perception suffices to find an adequate inferential connection 
between the contents of the human mind and extra-mental reality. In a clear and 
distinct way we cognitively grasp the concept of supremely perfect being as the 
concept that we do not construct by an arbitrary definition of the word ‘God’.
Descartes’ ontological proof (or ontological argument) remains a mystery. 
on the one hand Descartes based his reasoning on simple and convincing 
premises, but on the other he proceeded as though he did not notice that 
he so quickly and easily resolved such an  important and complicated 
problem as the problem of the existence of God. The impression of 
mystery increases when we turn our attention to the fact that so many 
important philosophical figures from the past and from recent times 
strongly criticized Descartes’ version of ontological proof by pointing 
out that in his reasoning (if it was reasoning at all) he had committed 
a decisive error: the conclusion seems not to follow from the premises. 
many of these criticisms were put to Descartes by official objectors to the 
Meditations, but his responses were complicated and not always as clear 
as they could be.1
1 J. Cottingham, r. stoothoff, D. murdoch (eds. and trans.), The Philosophical Writings 
of Descartes (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1984).
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Is it reasonable to assume that such a great thinker as Descartes didn’t 
notice that he had committed an elementary error? Was it possible that 
he didn’t notice an almost obvious error in the reasoning that he planned 
to become a fundament of his entire philosophical and scientific system? 
This system not only contributed to the development of modern science, 
but first of all changed the whole western philosophical thought in 
an important way. This historical state of affairs, can, I think, motivate the 
hypothesis that Descartes was in possession of some good response to the 
objection that he committed an elementary error. In what will follow I will 
try to reconstruct Descartes’ possible reaction to the objection that he was 
completely wrong in the conviction that he proved the existence of God.
Descartes’ version of ontological proof appears mainly in his Mediations 
and can be formulated in the following way.
(1)  I have an idea of supremely perfect being (the idea of God)
(2) existence is a perfection
(3) Therefore, a supremely perfect being (God) exists.
I will begin with the second of Descartes’ two premises, i.e. with the 
assumption that existence is a  perfection. As is well known, the most 
famous objection against this assumption was delivered by I. Kant, who 
claimed that existence is not a property or a predicate. Kant’s example 
was that there is no intrinsic difference between the concept of a hundred 
real thalers and the concept of a hundred possible thalers.2 According 
to Kant, when we claim that God exists we are affirming that there is 
an object to which our concept of God refers, but existence as such adds 
nothing to the concept of a  thing. but is it reasonable to suppose that 
Descartes was not aware of this rather not particularly sophisticated 
state of affairs? Did he not notice that in order to ascribe to whatever 
object whatever perfections, one must first in some way get to know that 
this object exists? It seems to me that Descartes would agree with Kant 
that existence is not a predicate that refers to some property, but that he 
would still accept that, where a  supremely perfect being is concerned, 
existence is contained in the concept of that being. How is it possible?
I think that Descartes’ intentions can be summarized in the following 
way. In a  clear and distinct way we cognitively grasp the concept 
of supremely perfect being as the concept that we do not construct 
by an  arbitrary definition of the word ‘God’. In the content of that 
2 I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp smith, (london: macmillan 
education ltd., 1990), A599/b627.
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concept we discover an  element of existence, but this does not mean 
that we assume that ‘existence’ is some general property among other 
such properties, the property which could be predicated on whatever 
content we can think of. Clear and distinct perception of existence as 
contained in the concept of supremely perfect being can be compared 
to the perception of a property which makes some object unique. It is 
a  kind of cognitive access to the strongly individuating property, e.g. 
to something more or less comparable to Duns scotus’ ‘haecceitas’. In 
our present cognitive situation we human beings do not have cognitive 
access to strongly individuating properties which are not predicates. We 
do not have such access except to the content of the concept of God. 
If this is so, then ‘being a predicate’ and ‘being an element of a concept’ 
are different things. Descartes was convinced that existence, which in 
all other cases is not contained in the content of a concept, in the case 
of God is an element of the concept referring to Him. This fact can be 
seen as the reason why today there appear interpretations stressing that 
Descartes’ ontological argument is not an argument in the sense of some 
discourse or reasoning but that here we rather have to make do with 
an ‘insight’ into the content of some peculiar concept, ‘insight’ in which 
we cognitively grasp a property (perfection) that is not a predicate. In 
this way we intuitively come to know that God exists.3
3 “He [Descartes] should be able to dismiss most objections in one neat trick by 
insisting on the non-logical nature of the demonstration. This is especially true of 
objection that the ontological argument begs the question. If God’s existence is ultimately 
self-evident and known by simple intuition of the mind, then there are no questions to 
be begged.” (l. Nolan, Descartes’ Ontological Argument, in: The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. e.N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-ontological, 2011). 
responding to the difficulty raised by b. leftow (The Ontological Argument, in: W.  J. 
Wainwright [ed.], The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion [oxford: ouP, 2005], 
pp. 90-115 [p. 82]), that even if existence were an element contained in the concept of 
God, this fact should be demonstrated independently from ontological proof, I. Ziemiński 
stresses that this objection is not a decisive one, because the impossibility of showing 
independently from ontological proof that existence is an element of the concept of God 
points to the fact that in the case of Descartes’ argument we do not have to deal with any 
formal reasoning, but we only explicate our intuition concerning the essence of God. In 
effect we get the sentence ‘God exists’ and this sentence should be treated as obvious, 
in the same way as we accept as obvious the sentence ‘something exists’. The falsity of 
that sentence is excluded a priori. From this it follows that Descartes does not beg the 
question but explicates the content of the concept of God which is unique and necessarily 
has a  real referent (I. Ziemiński, Argumenty za istnieniem Boga, [Arguments for the 
existence of God] in: s. T. Kołodziejczyk [ed.], Przewodnik po metafizyce [A Companion 
to metaphysics] [Kraków: Wydawnictwo WAm, 2011], pp. 549-591 [p. 562]).
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even if we accepted that ‘being a  predicate’ and ‘being an  element 
of a  concept’ are different things, the question would remain in what 
sense is existence a perfection? What did Descartes have in mind when 
he maintained that existence is a  kind of perfection? There are three 
principal senses of perfection. First, in the narrow axiological sense we 
talk about moral perfection. This kind of perfection we ascribe to those 
people who possess the capability of maximum moral sacrifice. Also to 
this narrow axiological sense of perfection belong our evaluative attitudes 
towards works of art. In this case we talk about aesthetic perfection. 
Although this narrow axiological understanding of perfection reflects 
our human feelings and cognitions of what is positively valuable and what 
is negatively valuable, this fact does not preclude that in our axiology 
we can refer to values and antivalues which are objective, i.e. obligatory 
(or antiobligatory) for all finite subjects capable of evaluation. but when 
Descartes maintained that existence is a perfection, he was not referring 
to perfection in this narrow axiological sense.
In the second sense we interpret ‘perfection’ as a maximal realization 
of potentialities that belong to some object but this object does not need 
to be susceptible to any moral or aesthetic assessment. In every-day life it 
very often happens that we are talking about objects or things more or less 
perfect, which depends on how we assess the degree of realization of their 
potentialities. ‘Perfection’ as the maximal realization of potentialities 
belonging to some object I propose here to call perfection in the formal 
sense. We apply this formal sense of perfection to empirical things, for 
example a perfect sword, but also to the objects which – at least at first 
glance – do not seem to be empirical things. An  idea of a  triangle is 
perfect in the formal sense of ‘perfect’ but an  idea of a  triangle is not 
an  empirical thing. None of the real triangles ever exactly realizes all 
requirements which ideally are realized in the idea itself. According to 
Plato the degree of realization of potentialities is the measure of goodness 
for every object or thing and from this Plato concluded that the idea 
of the Good is the highest idea of all. Plato’s understanding of what is 
good and of what is perfect became universally accepted in Western 
philosophy and culture.
Formal and narrowly axiological interpretations of what is perfect 
overlap. on the one hand what for us human beings is morally positive 
we measure by the degree of realization of moral sacrifice. on the other 
hand, the degree of realization of some property or properties very 
often requires axiological evaluation in the broader sense of ‘axiological’. 
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In some circumstances a sharper sword is better than the sword that is 
less sharp and then we talk about practical or utilitarian values.
When Descartes claimed that existence is a  kind of perfection he 
was neither referring to the narrowly axiological sense of perfection 
nor to the broader sense of this term but he meant the third sense of 
perfection which I  propose here to call metaphysical. Perfection in 
this metaphysical sense means existence itself, i.e. existence taken 
against the background of possible total non-existence or against the 
background of ‘absolute nothingness’. Not only Kant’s real thalars but 
also his possible thalars, i.e. possible as only thought by some thinking 
subject, or possible in the sense of being ‘objectively possible’ – all these 
‘things’ already exist, which means that they are different from radical 
non-existence or from an ‘absolute nothingness’. If nothing existed at all, 
if nothing was thought by any subject capable of thinking, if nothing was 
even ‘objectively possible’, and if in this situation something began to 
exist, then it would appear to be some perfection. even purely possible 
existence, i.e. existence not realized in some medium or dimension of 
realization, is perfection in this metaphysical sense of perfection, because 
even pure possibilities exist somehow and as such they must be different 
from ‘absolute nothingness’. This shows that ‘existence’ can be taken to 
be a perfection, although ‘existence’ is not a general property contained 
in the concept of a thing - except in the concept of a ‘supremely perfect 
being’. In this unique case ‘existence’ not being a predicate is nevertheless 
a property, i.e. a strongly individuating property.
Now I  would like to reformulate Descartes’ version of ontological 
proof as follows:
(1) I have an idea of supremely perfect being (the idea of God)
(2) existence, i.e. existence as contrasted with ‘absolute nothingness’, 
is a perfection
(3) Therefore, a supremely perfect being (God) exists.
even this reformulation leaves us with the famous principal objection 
that Descartes made an  unjustified move from the mental world of 
concepts to the real (or actual) existence of a  supremely perfect being. 
Critics have very often pointed out that from his reasoning it only follows 
that the concept of existence is inseparably connected to the concept of 
a  supremely perfect being. If such logical inferences were justified, we 
could apply ontological arguments to perfect islands, ideal lions, etc., i.e. 
to all kinds of contingent things. We would only need to build existence 
into the concept of a perfect island or into the concept of an ideal lion, 
192 sTANIsŁAW JuDYCKI
and from that then we could infer that a perfect island or an ideal lion 
exists.4 This objection in my opinion involves two interrelated confusions. 
The first one concerns the relation between words and meanings and the 
second one is connected with three kinds of meanings with which human 
mind is able to operate. Here I  think about the meanings referring to 
artefacts, the meanings referring to empirical things and the meanings for 
which the best examples come from elementary mathematics and logic.
The meanings which refer to artefacts can be freely changed. The 
meaning which we associate with the english word ‘table’ can be defined 
as referring to the things which are made of wood or to the things which 
are made of wood and of ice, etc. We can assume that the word ‘table’ 
refers only to the things which are used to write on them or to refer to the 
things which are used not only for writing but also for eating, etc.
The meanings we use to refer to empirical things found in this world 
can also be changed, but not in an  arbitrary way. We change some 
elements of these meanings as a result of new observations, experiments 
and investigations (scientific or ‘folk investigations’). In the meaning of 
the english word ‘water’ is contained the fact that water is a colourless, 
4 N. everitt claims that we can freely form some word, for example ‘shunicorn’, and 
then define it as a being in the case of which existence belongs to its essence. From this we 
can then infer that ‘shunicorn exists’: “if a made-up word like ‘God’ can refer to something 
with true and immutable nature, why cannot the same be true of a made-up word like 
‘shunicorn’?” (N. everitt, The Non-Existence of God [london and New York: routledge, 
2004], p. 39). J. H. sobel interprets Descartes’ ontological proof in the following way: 
“Any supremely perfect being exists” and stresses that this sentence is necessary but at 
the same time lacks an existential character. It is grounded in a  ‘stipulative definition’ 
(J. H. sobel, Logic and Theism. Arguments For and Against Beliefs in God [Cambridge: 
CuP, 2004], p. 37). The ontological proof is interpreted in the same way by G. oppy, 
who describes Descartes’ reasoning as belonging the class of ‘definitional ontological 
arguments’. According to oppy the structure of this class of ontological arguments is 
characterized by the following reasoning: “God is a being which has every perfection. 
(This is true as a matter of definition). existence is a perfection. Hence God exists.” oppy 
thinks that “The inference from ‘by definition, God is existent being’, to ‘God exists’ 
is patently invalid”. (G. oppy, Ontological Arguments, in: The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, red. e. N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-Arguments/, 
2007; cf. also G. oppy, Ontological Arguments and Belief in God (Cambridge: CuP, 
1995), pp. 20-24. even D. A. Dombrowski, who supports C. Hartshorne’s version of 
ontological argument, has written: “in the Meditations Descartes speaks as if existence, 
in contrast to non-existence, is a predicate or quality such that to lack it is to fall short of 
perfection. He thereby appears vulnerable to Kant’s critique of the ontological argument.” 
(D. A. Dombrowski, Rethinking the Ontological Argument: A  Neoclassical Theistic 
Response [Cambridge: CuP, 2006], p. 20).
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odourless substance, which is found in rivers and lakes, but this meaning 
also contains a  scientific element: water is H20. Nevertheless future 
scientific investigations can provide us with reasons to think that water 
has a different chemical composition than H20. The meanings by which 
we refer to empirical things are not arbitrary but they are ‘open’ to 
changes, open to future observations, experiments, investigations. This 
can be taken as the reason why it does not make sense to talk about 
a  perfect lion. We human beings are not in a  position to clearly and 
distinctively grasp the nature of a  lion. In other words, the elements 
contained in this concept are not accessible to us in the same way as we 
apprehend the idea of a triangle. We are not able to do this, because the 
nature of a lion is open to future investigations.
It is a totally different state of affairs in the realm of meanings belonging 
to elementary mathematics and logic. We can clearly and distinctively 
grasp the elements contained in these meanings. by grasping these 
meanings, we also become aware that we only discover them. All elements 
contained in them are not made by any arbitrary definition, but they are 
discovered as necessary. We cannot define the meaning of the english word 
‘triangle’ in such a way that it will refer to objects made of wood, used in 
kitchens, or define it as referring to objects which are carnivorous, which 
sometimes roar, etc. We also strongly believe that no future investigations 
will be able to change the elements contained in the meaning which we 
associate with the english word ‘triangle’. The meanings or ideas of this 
third kind Descartes interpreted as innate and his reason for doing so 
were characteristics of our human experience of them: we only encounter 
these meanings by using the memory of our mind and we encounter them 
as having an obvious trait of necessity.
At this stage of the interpretation of Descartes’ version of ontological 
proof someone could object that we are also in a  position to change 
meanings expressed even by elementary mathematical sentences as was 
the case with non-euclidian geometries. In the course of the development 
of mathematical sciences it turned out that the sum of angles in a triangle 
does not have to be equal to the sum of two right angles. ‘A Triangle’ 
in one geometrical system means and refers to something different 
than ‘a  triangle’ in another geometrical system, because the meaning 
of ‘space’ was changed. Is it possible to make a  similar change to the 
meaning contained in the expression ‘supremely perfect being’? Is it 
possible to give some new interpretation to the elements contained in 
the expression ‘supremely perfect being’? As I can see it, it is not possible, 
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because if someone wanted to say that a supremely perfect being must 
not be omnipotent, or that it must not be omniscient, he would not be 
referring to the supremely perfect being (God) at all. This is the reason 
why the existence of God must be seen as more certain than even the 
most certain logical and mathematical truths.
Now Descartes’ version of ontological proof can be formulated once more:
(1) I have an idea of supremely perfect being (the idea of God), i.e. 
I encounter the meaning that I am not in a position to define in 
an arbitrary way,
(2) existence, i.e. existence as contrasted with ‘absolute nothingness’, 
is a perfection
(3) Therefore, a supremely perfect being (God) exists.
Now it will not be especially difficult to find an adequate response to 
the objection that in the case of Descartes’ version of ontological proof we 
have to do an illicit leap from what is mental to the extramental reality or 
actuality. In the same way as we have to think that the fact that its angles 
equal two right angles cannot be separated from the idea of a triangle, 
we must also think that existence (or necessary existence) cannot be 
separated from the idea of a supremely perfect being. If we accept truths 
expressed by elementary mathematical sentences, we also have to accept 
this elementary metaphysical truth that the idea of a supremely perfect 
being contains its existence. Nevertheless, someone could still object that 
from the acceptance of the mathematical truth about the sum of angles 
in a triangle, it does not follow that triangles exist. but is there any sense 
in the supposition that in the possibly non-existing triangles their angles 
equal two right angles? Would it be reasonable to suppose that we must 
only think in this way but that in reality we do not know anything about 
triangles and their properties? It seems to me that we can only entertain 
such a possibility but we will not believe that it is possible.5
5 P. van Inwagen (Ontological Arguments, in: C. Taliaferro, P. Draper, P. l. Quinn 
(eds.), A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, second edition [oxford: Wiley-blackwell, 
2010], pp. 359-367 [p. 360]) assumes that Descartes’ argument establishes that the 
idea of a perfect being which does not exist is an inconsistent idea (just as the idea of 
a body that has no shape is an inconsistent idea). According to van Inwagen “from this 
it does not follow that a perfect being exists. That it does not follow is easy to see, for 
the idea of an X that does not exist is an inconsistent idea, no matter what X may be. 
The idea of a  non-existent unicorn, for example, is an  inconsistent idea, for nothing 
could possibly be a  non-existent unicorn. but that fact does not entail that there are 
unicorns, and neither does the fact that “non-existent perfect being” is an inconsistent 
idea entail that there is perfect being”. but it seems as though van Inwagen did not notice 
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Does it make any sense to expect something more from the Descartes’ 
version of an ontological proof? Is it not enough that it is true that to the 
idea of a supremely perfect being belongs its existence? Here we must not 
lose from our sight the fact that a supremely perfect being (God) is not 
real, when by ‘real’ we wanted to understand something which is located 
in spatio-temporal framework. supremely perfect being is also not 
actual, if by ‘actual’ we meant ‘realized in some medium of realization’ 
or ‘exemplified in some dimension of exemplification’. In the case of 
triangles we can imagine that all sentences referring to them are true, 
but that nevertheless it is still possible that there are no real or actual 
triangles. Can we accordingly imagine that it is true that to the idea of 
a  supremely perfect being belongs its existence but that nevertheless 
God is not realized or not exemplified or that He is not actual? but the 
supremely perfect being (God) exists absolutely, and if the sentence 
concerning the relation between His nature and His existence is true then 
this truth cannot be separated from the fact of His absolute existence.
that the starting point of Descartes’ reasoning was not a negative state of affairs. It was 
not a negative supposition that the idea of a non-existent perfect being is an inconsistent 
idea but a positive one, namely the fact that existence is a perfection, although, as I tried 
to show, it is not a predicate. From this positive state of affairs Descartes inferred that 
perfect being exists. van Inwagen seems also to confuse things which can exist only in the 
mind but not in reality with the strange suggestion that in extramental realm there could 
exist non-existent things, for example non-existent unicorns. The traditional scholastic 
distinction between ‘essence’ and ‘existence’ did not contain any suggestion that in 
extramental reality there could be non-existent things or objects. The philosophical 
distinction between essence and existence expresses a common-sense belief that in our 
minds we can have many objects which do not exist in reality.
